The long-run cost of job loss as measured by consumption changes by Browning, Martin & Crossley, Thomas F.
www.ssoar.info
The long-run cost of job loss as measured by
consumption changes
Browning, Martin; Crossley, Thomas F.
Postprint / Postprint
Zeitschriftenartikel / journal article
Zur Verfügung gestellt in Kooperation mit / provided in cooperation with:
www.peerproject.eu
Empfohlene Zitierung / Suggested Citation:
Browning, M., & Crossley, T. F. (2008). The long-run cost of job loss as measured by consumption changes. Journal of
Econometrics, 145(1-2), 109-120. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jeconom.2008.05.005
Nutzungsbedingungen:
Dieser Text wird unter dem "PEER Licence Agreement zur
Verfügung" gestellt. Nähere Auskünfte zum PEER-Projekt finden
Sie hier: http://www.peerproject.eu Gewährt wird ein nicht
exklusives, nicht übertragbares, persönliches und beschränktes
Recht auf Nutzung dieses Dokuments. Dieses Dokument
ist ausschließlich für den persönlichen, nicht-kommerziellen
Gebrauch bestimmt. Auf sämtlichen Kopien dieses Dokuments
müssen alle Urheberrechtshinweise und sonstigen Hinweise
auf gesetzlichen Schutz beibehalten werden. Sie dürfen dieses
Dokument nicht in irgendeiner Weise abändern, noch dürfen
Sie dieses Dokument für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke
vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, aufführen, vertreiben oder
anderweitig nutzen.
Mit der Verwendung dieses Dokuments erkennen Sie die
Nutzungsbedingungen an.
Terms of use:
This document is made available under the "PEER Licence
Agreement ". For more Information regarding the PEER-project
see: http://www.peerproject.eu This document is solely intended
for your personal, non-commercial use.All of the copies of
this documents must retain all copyright information and other
information regarding legal protection. You are not allowed to alter
this document in any way, to copy it for public or commercial
purposes, to exhibit the document in public, to perform, distribute
or otherwise use the document in public.
By using this particular document, you accept the above-stated
conditions of use.
Diese Version ist zitierbar unter / This version is citable under:
https://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:0168-ssoar-131845
Accepted Manuscript
The long-run cost of job loss as measured by consumption changes
Martin Browning, Thomas F. Crossley
PII: S0304-4076(08)00056-0
DOI: 10.1016/j.jeconom.2008.05.005
Reference: ECONOM 3036
To appear in: Journal of Econometrics
Please cite this article as: Browning, M., Crossley, T.F., The long-run cost of job loss as
measured by consumption changes. Journal of Econometrics (2008),
doi:10.1016/j.jeconom.2008.05.005
This is a PDF file of an unedited manuscript that has been accepted for publication. As a
service to our customers we are providing this early version of the manuscript. The manuscript
will undergo copyediting, typesetting, and review of the resulting proof before it is published in
its final form. Please note that during the production process errors may be discovered which
could affect the content, and all legal disclaimers that apply to the journal pertain.
AC
C
EP
TE
D
M
AN
U
SC
R
IP
T
ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT
The Long-Run Cost of Job Loss as Measured by
Consumption Changes
Martin Browning
University of Oxford and IFS
Thomas F. Crossley1
University of Cambridge, McMaster University and IFS
January 2008
1Corresponding Author. Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge, Cam-
bridge CB39DD, England. Phone: +44-1223-335225. Fax: +44-1223-335475.
Thomas.Crossley@econ.cam.ac.uk.
AC
C
EP
TE
D
M
AN
U
SC
R
IP
T
ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT
Abstract
We consider the measurement of the cost of job displacement. With a Canadian panel
survey we compare the consumption growth of households that experienced a permanent
layoﬀ to a control group of households that experienced a temporary layoﬀ with known
recall date. Because the firms employing the latter group are providing insurance, these
workers approximate a benchmark of full insurance against job loss shocks. We estimate
that permanent layoﬀs experience an average consumption loss of between 4 and 10
percent. Older workers and workers with high job tenure have losses closer to the top of
this range.
JEL Classifications: D91, J63, J65
Keywords: Job Displacement, Consumption
AC
C
EP
TE
D
M
AN
U
SC
R
IP
T
ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT
1 Introduction
For many workers the loss of a job because of plant closure or a permanent layoﬀ may
involve a considerable loss of lifetime welfare. These workers bear a disproportionate share
of the costs of reallocation in a dynamic economy. Given the potential for large losses,
there a number of alternative policies for governments to follow. One is the employment
protection route in which governments make it as diﬃcult as possible for firms to lay oﬀ
workers. This has a potentially harmful impact on hiring and does not address the losses
to workers when firms do in fact go bankrupt. A second option is to provide generous
unemployment benefits for a long time in order to allow workers to search for the best
fit in a new job. Once again this has deleterious side eﬀects and still does not address
the issue that even with such a Unemployment Insurance scheme some workers will still
experience a large negative permanent shock. A third (hypothetical) policy option is to
provide full insurance against such losses. In this paper we attempt to quantify the gains
from such insurance.
Job displacement studies have typically been concerned with the eﬀect of displacement
on short run earnings and wages and the duration of joblessness. The attempt to quantify
the long run welfare loss due displacement against a full insurance benchmark faces at
least two major problems. The first of these is the diﬃculty in measuring changes in
lifetime welfare. The second problem is that given a sample of displaced workers we do
not have a natural control group who faced full insurance and hence experienced no gain
or loss consequent on their being displaced or not.
As regards the first problem, even if we have long panels and examine earnings, the
mapping from wage or earnings paths to lifetime welfare is not a simple one. In all but
the simplest frictionless labour market models wages depend on household preferences
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(discount factors, risk aversion and prudence) and the possibilities open to households
for intertemporal smoothing. Thus changes in wage or earnings possibilities cannot be
simply mapped into changes in welfare without an explicit theory model. In addition,
if there are other potential or actual earners in the household then even a large loss of
earnings by one partner may not lead to a sharp fall in lifetime welfare. Thus the presence
of other potential earners in the household provides some natural (self) insurance even
without outside options. These diﬃculties are compounded by the fact that we do not
usually have a long panel so that we have to extrapolate from short run changes using
standard earnings processes. The latter may not be reliable for those who have recently
been displaced.
In the paper we propose dealing with this problem by using changes in consumption
to trace out long run impacts. Just as with wages or earnings, this requires a formal
model within which we can measure and interpret the lifetime loss from observations on
consumption before and after job displacement. We develop such a framework in Section
2 using a conventional life-cycle model with forward looking agents. Our framework
takes account of short run adjustment to the displacement, the possible presence of other
earners, other idiosyncratic shocks, macro shocks and changes in demographics. Within
this framework we can define a ‘treatment’ (the negative economic shock associated with
an imperfectly insured job loss) and an appropriate counter factual (perfect insurance
against such shocks). We can also discuss the choice of estimator. As we shall see, a
convenient estimator within our theoretical framework uses matching techniques.
The second major problem mentioned above is not having a natural control group.
In the displacement literature the usual comparison is between displaced workers and
workers who retain their job. While this may be a useful comparison in some contexts,
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it is not appropriate for our purposes since workers who continue in their jobs and who
had a positive prior probability of losing the job actually experience a welfare gain.
Uncertainty has resolved in their favour. In this view, the comparison of the displaced to
those who retain their job overestimates the loss (relative to full insurance) experienced
by the displaced. Instead we compare changes in lifetime outcomes between the displaced
and those who were temporarily laid oﬀ and expect to be recalled at a specific date. We
maintain that this group is closer to the desired counter-factual since they are in firms
that use temporary layoﬀs and hence provide considerable insurance (albeit, possibly less
than full) to their workers.
Naturally, the use of temporarily laid oﬀ workers to estimate the counterfactual for
permanent laid oﬀ workers requires a conditional independence assumption: conditional
on observables, expected consumption growth under full insurance should be the same
for the two groups. The plausibility of this assumption is helped by the richness of the
set of observables our data allow us to condition on.
This paper is a contribution to three literatures. The first is the extensive literature on
the eﬀects of job displacement; see and Fallick (1996), Kletzer (1998) and Kuhn (2002)
for surveys. Second, this paper is related to tests of full insurance and consumption
growth around idiosyncratic shocks such as job loss, illness or disability; see, for example,
Cochrane (1991) and Stephens (2001). Finally, what we present here is a complement
to work on the short run costs of job loss and the impact of Unemployment Insurance
benefits (see Gruber (1997) and Browning and Crossley (2001) and (2003)).
Our main finding is that permanently displaced workers suﬀer an average consumption
loss of between 4 and 10 percent. Older workers and workers with high job tenure have
losses closer to the top of this range. As this estimate is relative to our best approximation
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of a full insurance benchmark, it provides an upper bound on the value of new policy
initiatives designed to mitigate the costs of job loss.
The next section develops our theoretical framework, which in turn suggests a natural
estimation strategy. Section 3 describes the data. Our results are presented in Section 4.
Section 5 discusses the policy implications of our results and Section 6 concludes.
2 Theoretical Framework
In a conventional life-cycle model (which assumes a forward-looking, optimizing house-
hold), the marginal utility of expenditure mue λt evolves according to:
λt+1 = λt + εt+1, Et (εt+1) = 0. (1)
We now develop a framework that will allow us to quantify the eﬀect of a job loss in
terms of the mue. Risk averse households desire to hold the mue constant across possible
states of the world. In the ideal situation, in which society provided full insurance against
idiosyncratic risk, a household’s mue responds only to aggregate shocks.
Let d be an indicator variable that takes value 1 if the agent keeps her job from
period t to t+1 and 0 if she is displaced. Et() denotes the expectation for a given agent,
conditional on the information available to the agent at time t. We assume an additive
structure for the job retention/loss shock and other shocks:
εt+1 = (1− d)Γ0t + dΓ1t + ηt+1 (2)
where Γdt is the shock consequent on the realization d and ηt+1 is the eﬀect of other
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shocks. The additivity here between job retention/loss shocks and other shocks is for
convenience. Nevertheless, without some structure it is much hard to make sense of the
question “what are the costs of job loss?”1 Note that we do not assume that job loss and
other shocks are independently distributed.
We shall always assume:
Γ0t > 0 > Γ
1
t (3)
so that a job loss is equivalent to a wealth loss (which raises the mue, all other things
being equal). Critically for the development below, it follows that retaining a job is
a positive shock for agents who faced a positive probability of job loss (the mue falls,
indicating that the agent is better oﬀ). If the agent had full insurance against job loss
shocks then we would have:
Γ0t = Γ
1
t = 0 (4)
since the realization of d does not make any diﬀerence to the agent. In the displaced
worker literature attention has focussed on diﬀerences between remaining in the job and
being displaced; in the current context this is given by (Γ1t − Γ0t ). For our policy driven
analysis the appropriate object of interest is Γ0t , since the full insurance benchmark is
zero.
Let πt be the probability at time t of d = 1. We have:
Et (εt+1) = πt
¡
Γ1t +Et
¡
ηt+1 | d = 1
¢¢
+
(1− πt)
¡
Γ0t +Et
¡
ηt+1 | d = 0
¢¢
. (5)
1Absent additivity, answering this question would requires some arbitrary decomposition of the eﬀects
of the shocks.
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Combining this with (1) we have:
πt
¡
Γ1t +Et
¡
ηt+1 | d = 1
¢¢
= − (1− πt)
¡
Γ0t +Et
¡
ηt+1 | d = 0
¢¢
. (6)
If Et
¡
ηt+1 | d = 0
¢ ' Et ¡ηt+1 | d = 1¢ and πt is close to unity then Γ0t >> |Γ1t | so that
the job loss shock is much greater than the job retention shock.
We expect that the eﬀect of the job loss shock is heterogeneous across workers. We
shall sometimes parameterize the job loss shock in terms of observables at time t. Specif-
ically:
Γ0t = γ
0
t + γ
0zt (7)
where zt is a vector of observable factors that aﬀect the size of the job loss shock. These
include tenure in the current job, gender, union status, and age. Of course, many de-
terminants of the job loss shock may be unobservable, such as the job match quality or
family financial circumstances; these are captured by γ0.
The analysis above focuses on the unobservable mue. The next step is to relate this to
(observable) consumption. Denote consumption in period t by ct. We take the following
form for consumption growth:
∆ ln ct+1 = ∆φt+1 −∆λt+1 (8)
where the time varying factor ∆φt+1 includes anticipated changes in factors that aﬀect
utility (for example, age, marital status or children). This includes potentially observable
factors and unobserved factors.2 Substituting in (1) and (2) and taking expectations
2While we think of this formulation as an approximation, it is worth noting that it holds exactly if
(i) the agent has a rate of time preference equal to the interest rate; and (ii) the agent has the following
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conditional on displacement, d = 0, we have:
Et (∆ ln ct+1 | d = 0) = ∆φt+1 − Γ0t − Et
¡
ηt+1 | d = 0
¢
. (9)
To simplify notation, we henceforth denote Et
¡
ηt+1 | d = 0
¢
by μ0t (and Et
¡
ηt+1 | d = 1
¢
by μ1t ) so that we can express a households expected consumption growth conditional on
job loss as:
Et (∆ ln ct+1 | d = 0) = ∆φt+1 − Γ0t − μ0t . (10)
The objects we aim to estimate are the average eﬀect of job loss on the mue, on
those who experience job loss (denoted EH [Γ0t | d = 0]) and the relationship between
that mean and observable characteristics, zt. Note that EH [] denotes an average across
the population of job losers and H indexes job losers. Thus EH [Γ0t | d = 0] is the
analogue, in this context, of the “average eﬀect of the treatment on the treated”, where
the “treatment” is job loss.3 Given the parameterization in equation (7), the relationship
between this quantity and characteristics (zt) is captured by γ. Equation (10) says that
the expected consumption growth for job loser is the sum of anticipated changes, the
eﬀect of the job loss and the eﬀect of other shocks, given that the agent is displaced.
per period utility function:
u(ct) = (φt − 1− ln ct)ct;
φt − 1− ln ct > 0.
This utility function has the usual properties: positive marginal utility, risk aversion (a negative second
derivative) and prudence (a positive 3rd derviative.)
3Note that this means that we are not estimating the average eﬀect of job loss on a worker selected at
random from the pool of workers that could potential lose a job, but rather the average eﬀect on actual
job losers.
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Averaging across job losers gives:
EH [Et (∆ ln ct+1 | d = 0) | d = 0]
= EH [∆φt+1,h | d = 0]−EH [Γ0t,h(zt,h) | d = 0]−EH [μ0t,h | d = 0]
= EH [∆φt+1,h | d = 0]−EH [γ0t,h | d = 0] (11)
−EH [γ 0zt,h | d = 0]−EH [μ0t,h | d = 0].
If we could assume that μ0t,h and ∆φt+1,h are uncorrelated with observed job loss cost
factors ( zt) then we could simply regress consumption growth on the observables, for the
sample of displaced workers, to estimate γ. This is unsatisfactory in two respects. First,
EH [γ0 | d = 0] is not identified separately from EH [∆φt+1,h | d = 0] and EH [μ0t,h | d = 0].
This means that, even with this assumption, we can only estimate how the cost of job
loss varies with observable characteristics (zt,h) but not the overall level of eﬀect. The
overall level is crucial from a policy point of view, where we may (for example) wish to
relate the average costs of job loss to public expenditures on a proposed labour market
program.
Second, the assumption that μ0t,h and ∆φt+1 are uncorrelated with observed job loss
cost factors (zt,h) is diﬃcult to maintain. For example, it would require that the eﬀect of
all other shocks
¡
μ0t,h
¢
not vary with the observed determinants of the job loss shock such
as age, occupation or education. As regards to ∆φt+1,h, this includes life-cycle factors
that are also likely correlated with γ0 and z: for example, age, material status, and
family type. If μ0t,h and ∆φt+1 are correlated with observed job loss cost factors (zt,h)
then the regression of consumption growth on the observables, for the sample of displaced
workers, does not even identify the way that the cost of job loss varies with observable
8
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characteristics.
Thus plausible identification of EH [Γ0t | d = 0] and γ requires that we have a way
to estimate EH [∆φt+1,h | d = 0] + EH [μ0t,h | d = 0]. Our strategy for doing so is to use
standard matching methods to construct a control group. This exploits the additivity
assumed above plus the usual kind of conditional mean independence assumptions:
EH
¡
μ0t,h | d = 0,X
¢
= EH
¡
μt,h | X
¢
(12)
EH
¡
∆φt+1,h | d = 0,X
¢
= EH
¡
∆φt+1,h | X
¢
(13)
where X is a set of observable characteristics used to match treatments and controls. In
addition, we will require that standard common support conditions are satisfied.4
A key point of this paper is to suggest that controls drawn from workers experiencing
continuing employment are unlikely to be appropriate, for two reasons. First, those in
continuing employment may be suﬃciently diﬀerent from job losers that it may not be
possible to adjust for the diﬀerences between them on the basis of observables. Second,
and more subtly, expected consumption growth for someone who is not displaced is the
sum of anticipated changes, the eﬀect of other shocks and the (positive) eﬀect of job
retention:
Et (∆ ln ct+1 | d = 1) = ∆φt+1 − Γ1t − μ1t (14)
Again, among workers with imperfect insurance against job losses, job retention is a
favorable resolution of uncertainty and this positive economic shock results in a welfare
gain. Thus even if the necessary conditional mean independence holds, we cannot use
those in continuing employment to estimate EH [∆φt+1,h | d = 0] and EH [μ0t,h | d = 0]
4Before doing this, we will present crude estimates based on simple diﬀerences in mean consumption
growth.
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because their consumption growth is confounded by Γ1t .5
The solution we propose is to draw our controls from workers who experience tempo-
rary layoﬀs with a definite recall date. First, these workers may be more similar to job
losers, and hence make an estimation strategy based on correcting for observable diﬀer-
ences more palatable. More importantly, these workers are receiving insurance against
job loss from their firms, so that plausibly:
Γ0t ≈ Γ1t ≈ 0 (15)
for these workers. While temporary layoﬀs involve an income loss, it is transitory, with
no loss of job match or firm specific human capital. Workers on temporary layoﬀ are
eligible for unemployment insurance, and in some cases temporary layoﬀ procedures are
carefully integrated with unemployment insurance provisions (for example, some workers
temporarily laid oﬀ from unionized firms receive a firm or union funded top up to their un-
employment insurance benefits.)6 Thus the consumption growth of workers experiencing
temporary layoﬀs can be used to estimate EH [∆φt+1 | d = 0] and EH [μ0t,h | d = 0].
To summarize, the empirical strategy that is motivated by the theoretical consider-
ations above, and which we will implement in this paper is as follows. To estimate the
5How large might this bias be? Manski and Straub (2000) report that in the mid - 1990s, a sample of
American workers had an subjective expecation of job loss of 15%. If μ0t = μ
1
t = 0, Equation (6) implies
that:
Γ1t = −
(1− π)
π
Γ0t ≈ 0.18Γ0t .
Note, however, that our sample of permanent job losers very likely had higher than average probabilities
of job loss. If we selected continuously employed controls to match these job losers on the basis of
observable characteristics, it is very likely that we also select controls who had a higher than average ex
ante expectation of job loss. This means a larger π, and hence a larger bias.
6Of course, the temporary layoﬀ may reveal information about the future viability of the firm - and
hence its ability to continue to provide insurance against job loss in the future. Alternatively, for a firm
whose continued operation is in doubt, a temporary layoﬀ may be a positive shock. Our claim is only
that such considerations are second order, so that temporary layoﬀs provide a good first approximation
to a full insurance benchmark.
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cost of job loss:
1. Use consumption growth to measure innovations in the mue.
2. Among the “treatment” group of job losers, consumption growth confounds the
eﬀects of job loss with the eﬀects of other shocks and anticipated changes in the
mue. These confounders would aﬀect consumption growth under the counterfactual
of full insurance against job loss shocks.
3. Construct a matched control group drawn from workers experiencing temporary
layoﬀ. Use this group to estimate consumption growth under the counterfactual of
full insurance against job loss shocks.
4. The diﬀerence in consumption growth between the job losers and matched controls
is an estimate of the cost of job loss among the job losers.
We now turn to a description of the data on which we implement this strategy.
3 Data
3.1 Survey
The data for this paper are drawn from a panel survey on Canadians who separated from
a job: the Canadian Out of Employment Panel (COEP). The survey was conducted by
Human Resources Development Canada (HRDC) to evaluate the eﬀects of a series of
changes in the Canadian Unemployment system in the mid- 1990s. A sample of some
11,000 workers who had a job separation in February or May of 1993 were interviewed
three times, at about 26, 39 and 60 weeks after the job separation. In Canada, when a job
separation occurs, the employer is obliged to file a “Record of Employment” (ROE) with
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HRDC. These reports are compiled into the database from which the sampling frame was
constructed. The sample is representative of job separations in relevant window. We refer
to the job separation that led to inclusion in the sample as the “reference” separation.7
Interviews were conducted over the telephone and took an average of 25 minutes.
A second sample of some 8,000 individuals who separated from a job in February or
May of 1995 was subsequently drawn (this sample is again representative of separations
in the relevant window). The survey instrument was refined (and slightly expanded) for
this second survey but care was taken to insure backwards comparability. In addition,
the third interview was dropped. Together, the 1993 and 1995 COEP surveys provide a
large sample of individuals who separated from a job. The period of 1993 to 1995 was
one of slowly improving labour market conditions in Canada (for example, the aggregate
unemployment rate fell from 11.2 to 9.5%).
A feature of the data is the wide range of questions were asked including questions
on the pre-separation job and reason for separation; labour market activity; job search
details; the activities of other household members; income; expenditure and assets. The
availability of expenditure data in a survey of this type is somewhat unique; further
details on these questions are given below.
In this paper our primary focus is on information about expenditures in the period
prior to the job separation (collected retrospectively at the first interview) and at the last
opportunity we have to observe the respondents (the third interview for respondents in
the 1993 sample and the second interview for respondents in the 1995 sample). The timing
7Because the administrative records that form the sampling frame are not complete until some months
after the job separation, it was not possible to have the first interview closer to the separation date. Thus
survey information about the periods just before and after the job separation are asked retrospectively
from a point some 6 months on. This long interval between the job separation and the first interview is
the price of a sample of only those who experience a job separation; this price is somewhat mitigated by
the availability of complimentary administrative data which is collected continuously.
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of the interviews was adjusted between the 1993 and 1995 samples so that the timing
(relative to the job separation) of the third interview for the former sample corresponds
roughly to the timing of the second interview for the latter sample. The details of
interview timing are presented in Table A1, in the Appendix.
One reason to focus on the last point at which respondents are observed is that
we wish to examine the change in the marginal utility of wealth (“permanent income”)
across a job loss. At earlier interviews, as smaller fraction of respondents are back in some
employment and a greater fraction of the sample may be liquidity constrained. Where
respondents are liquidity constrained our analysis of the permanent shock is confounded.8
3.2 Sample
With regard to sample selection we begin considering only respondents between the ages
of 20 and 60, and exclude single adults living with parents or unrelated adults. Extensive
experience with the data (as well as common sense) suggests that the latter group return
expenditure information which is of poor quality. We also exclude workers who held
multiple jobs at the separation date, one of which was ongoing.
Next we limit the sample to workers whose “reference” job had a duration of 6 months
or more. This corresponds to the notion that a job loss presumes some attachment to the
job. In fact, many studies have defined displaced workers as having “established work
histories” (Kletzer, 1998) and some studies have limited their analysis to workers who
lost jobs in which they had rather considerable tenure (for example, Jacobson, Lalonde
and Sullivan (1993)). In our empirical analysis diﬀerences across workers with diﬀerent
8The 1995 data contain direct questions about credit constraints between the job loss and the first
interview, and at the first interview data. These have been analyzed by Crossley and Low, (2004). The
reported incidence of binding credit constraints in these data is quite low. About a one in four permanent
layoﬀs report being unable to borrow at the first interview, but only about one in twenty-five report that
this is a binding constraint.
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levels of pre-separation tenure will be an important focus.
We use self reported (survey) information to identify layoﬀs and quits, and to exclude
other separation types (such as retirement).9 We then limit the quit group to those
who self reported that they quit to take another job. We have 402 such individuals.
While layoﬀs are our primary focus, these voluntary job switchers provide some useful
contrasts. In particular, among workers who voluntarily moved to (presumably better)
jobs, one would expect that the shock of the job separation is, if anything, positive (the
mue falls).
Among the layoﬀs, we distinguish types of layoﬀs on the basis of a series of survey
questions about the ex ante (at time of layoﬀ) expectation of recall. We define workers
to have had a strong expectation of recall if they expected to be recalled on a specific
date. We also refer to this group as “temporary layoﬀs”. Those workers who reported
no expectation of recall are our “permanent layoﬀs” and this is the principal group of
interest for this study. Note that this ex ante definition of job loss or “displacement”
diﬀers from much of the displaced worker literature in which “displacement” is defined
in terms of ex post realizations. However, conditioning on “time 0” information is much
more natural in the consumption growth framework developed in the previous section.
We also have a group of workers who expected recall but reported that they did not have
a particular date by which they expected to be recalled. We refer to these workers as
having “some expectation of recall”.
Our data contain 3028 “permanent layoﬀs” (no expectation of recall), 1094 “tempo-
rary layoﬀs” (strong expectation of recall) and 1419 workers with some expectation of
recall. The large number of temporary layoﬀs may be surprising to readers from outside
9The data also contain an administrative reason for separation (from the ROE form). These correlate
reasonably well with self reported reasons, but have the drawback of a very large “other” category.
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North America, but the important role of temporary layoﬀs in unemployment in North
American labour markets is well documented (see for example, Feldstein, 1976).10
Table A2 in the Appendix documents the demographic and economic characteristics
of respondents in each of the four groups just defined. The first panel of Table A2 reports
demographic characteristics. The most dramatic diﬀerences - in terms of age, education,
and local labour market conditions - are between quits and layoﬀs. The second panel of
this Table reports economic characteristics prior to the reference separation. Relative to
all layoﬀs, the quits have much shorter tenures on average. Comparing the temporary
and permanent layoﬀs we note that the temporary layoﬀs are more likely to be unionized
and have higher tenures. Note also that more than 80% of them expected the layoﬀ.
This further supports the notion that for this group, the shock associated with actual
separation may be small, and thus that they may provide a good approximation to the
full insurance benchmark.
In Table A3 we document the employment outcomes for these groups as of the first
interview. There is attrition in our sample between the first and last interviews (see the
first few rows of Table A2). In Table A3 we report the same first interview information for
all first interview respondents (in the top panel) and for the sub sample that subsequently
responded to the second interview (in the bottom panel). Comparing the top and bottom
panels we note that the numbers are very similar. Thus this very simple exercise does
not reveal any evidence that the attrition was nonrandom.
In terms of the actual outcomes we note that re-employment is much higher among
temporary layoﬀs and quits than permanent layoﬀs. A small number of ex ante permanent
layoﬀs do return to their former firm, while some ex ante temporary layoﬀs take work
10It’s worth noting that the Canadian Unemployment Insurance system (unlike the U.S. system) has
no experience rating of firms.
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else where. If not re-employed, a permanent layoﬀ is more likely to be actively searching
than a temporary layoﬀ. Workers with “some expectation of recall” exhibit outcomes
which lie somewhere between the permanent and temporary layoﬀ groups.
In Appendix Table A4 we summarize the labour market outcomes for these groups
at the final interview. Interestingly, the employment rate among temporary layoﬀs fall
from the first to final interview. This may be because the final interview is in the fifth
quarter after the reference separation, and temporary layoﬀs are often seasonal in nature
(even in non-seasonal manufacturing industries). By this point some 15% (26% of the
57% employed) of ex ante permanent layoﬀs have returned to their former firm, while
have almost 20% (29% of the 66% employed) ex ante temporary layoﬀs are working at a
new firm.
3.3 Expenditure Questions
For the purposes of this paper the most important set of variables are those concerning
expenditures. Two sets of questions were asked at each interview. The first was a set of
levels questions concerning expenditures in the past week or month on a range of goods
including housing; food at home; food outside the home; clothing and total expenditures
in a month. The second set comprised a single question regarding the change in total
expenditures relative to the month prior to the ROE (separation) date. In this paper
our focus in on total expenditures. This is consistent with the theoretical framework
developed in the previous section. It is also the only (expenditure) quantity for which
we have pre-separation information. Since these questions are somewhat unusual in a
survey of this type, we present the full text of the questions here. At each interview, the
respondent was asked:
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About how much did you and your household spend on everything in the past
month? Please think about all bills such as rent, mortgage loan payments,
utility and other bills, as well as all expenses such as food, clothing, trans-
portation, entertainment and any other expenses you and your household may
have.
And:
Has the amount you spend on everything decreased since <ROE>?
By what amount monthly?
Has the amount you spend on everything increased since <ROE>?
By what amount monthly?
The first question provides ct+1 (consumption at the interview date) and the following
sequence ∆ct+1 (the change since just prior to the reference separation).We approximate
∆ ln ct+1by
∆ct+1
ct+1
.11
Although the answers to these questions are undoubtedly noisy, we have several rea-
sons to believe that they contain significant information about the levels and changes in
household expenditures. First, we note that in each survey the expenditure questions
are asked before income questions, so that we think it is less likely that the respondents
just report incomes in response to expenditure questions. Second in other work (Brown-
ing and Crossley, 2001, 2003; Browning, Crossley and Weber, 2004) and in unreported
subsidiary analysis, we have amassed considerable internal and external evidence of the
11It is possible, of course, to construct ct (consumption just prior to the reference separation) from
ct+1 and ∆ct+1,and then appoximate ∆ ln ct+1by
∆ct+1
ct
.However, for the relative small growth rates we
consider, the two approximations diﬀer little, and, in the present context and, it is likely that ∆ct+1ct would
suﬀer from greater measurement error in the denominator.
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validity of the expenditure responses in the COEP. In particular income elasticities and
demographic eﬀects can be precisely estimated with this data (which would not be the
case if the data were simply noise) and the data perform well in a series of budget share
and Engel curve comparisons with the FAMEX, a Canadian household budget survey
thought to be of excellent quality.
3.4 A First Look at Earnings and Consumption Growth
Before turning to formal estimates of the costs of job loss, we provide a descriptive
analysis of earnings and consumption growth from just before a job separation until the
fifth quarter after job loss. Figure 1 presents box and whisker plots of proportional
consumption and earnings changes for layoﬀs with strong expectation of recall (i.e., a
recall date), some expectation of recall, and no expectation of recall (permanent layoﬀs)
as well as quits. In each case the left hand box reflects earnings growth and the right
hand box consumption growth. A number of statistics corresponding to these pictures
are presented in Table 1a. Diﬀerences across groups in earnings growth are stark. Five
quarters out, the median individual who quit to take another job experienced substantial
earnings growth (9%) while the median permanent layoﬀ has earnings almost 50% below
their pre-separation level. Both parametric tests of common means and nonparametric
rank tests suggest that the distribution of proportional earnings changes of permanent
layoﬀs is strongly statistically diﬀerent from that of the other groups.
In contrast to earnings, the diﬀerences in consumption growth are not so visually
striking. In every category the median change in consumption is zero. Nevertheless,
those who quit to take another job do appear - in both the figure and in the mean - to
experience stronger consumption growth than the other groups. The diﬀerences among
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the other groups are diﬃcult to discern from the box and whisker plots, but the statistical
tests reported in the bottom panel of Table 1a confirm that the permanent layoﬀs are
diﬀerent from each of the other groups. Temporary layoﬀs (strong expectation of recall)
experience stronger consumption growth than those with some expectation of recall, who
in turn experience more consumption growth than permanent layoﬀs (no expectation
of recall). As noted in the introduction, there are a number of reasons to expect that
any proportional change in individual earnings translates into a rather smaller change
in household consumption (the earnings loss may be transitory, the individual may be
providing only a fraction of household income). Nevertheless, the striking diﬀerences in
earnings and consumption data, combined with the way the consumption data are col-
lected, may suggest to some readers that the consumption data is simply noise. However,
the statistically significant diﬀerences across groups, and the strong consumption growth
of those who quit to take another job refutes that position.
As first reported in Table A1, the weeks elapsed between separation from the reference
job and the final interview varies between approximately 54 and 64 weeks in our sample.
The bottom row of Table 1a reports that the mean is between 58 and 59 weeks (about
9/8 of a year) for each of our separation type groups. Thus variation in elapsed time
does not seem to have played any role in the heterogeneity in earnings and consumption
growth across groups. Notice also that the data underlying both the figures and tables is
nominal. This was a relatively low inflation period in Canada. The respondents to our
sample experienced proportional changes in the CPI which ranged from -0.0018 to 0.027
(inflation of -0.1 to 2.7%). The bottom row of Table 1A reports that there was some
diﬀerence in the inflation experienced across groups, with in particular the permanent
layoﬀs experiencing on average one percentage point less inflation. This is a very small
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component of the diﬀerences in nominal consumption and earnings changes.
Figure 2 repeats the analysis of Figure 1, but with the sample limited to those who
report being back in employment at the last interview. The corresponding statistics are
reported in Table 1b. Several features of the Table bear notice. First, the diﬀerences in
earnings growth across layoﬀ groups largely disappear (in the means and figures - the rank
tests still suggest statistically diﬀerent distributions). Furthermore the median earnings
change in each layoﬀ group is non-negative. This suggests that among our sample the
earnings changes associated with job separations are all associated with non-employment
(and not with wage changes). This is inconsistent with studies of job displacement which
have focussed on highly attached workers (for example Ruhm, 1991) which find that both
wage and employment changes play a role, but it is consistent with studies such as Polsky
(1999) which examine job losers of a broad range of labour force attachment. However,
further breakdowns by tenure in the reference job revealed that in our data, as in most
other studies, high tenure workers experience wage losses on re-employment.12
A key result of this analysis is the very strong consumption growth exhibited by
voluntary job switchers, which averages 10% (over a period just longer than a year). A
reasonable interpretation of the data is that these workers have experienced a significant
positive shock to their lifetime wealth. This observation supports our assertion that great
care must be taken in comparing displaced workers to workers who are not displaced.
We now turn to implementing the estimation strategy developed in Section 2. In
doing so, we set aside the data on quits and on respondents with some expectation of
recall, and focus on the permanent layoﬀs (our “treatment” group) and the temporary
layoﬀs (those with a strong expectation of recall, from which we draw our controls.)
12Full results are available from the authors.
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4 Estimation Results
The first row of Table 3a reports the average consumption growth for our full sample
of permanent layoﬀs, and our full sample of temporary layoﬀs. The former report an
average consumption loss of 3.1%, while the latter report average consumption growth of
2.5%. The diﬀerence between these averages is -5.6%.13
However, the permanent and temporary layoﬀs diﬀer in many ways. Therefore we
use a matching procedure to estimate the counterfactual consumption growth of the
permanent layoﬀs. As noted above, our estimates then rely on a conditional independence
assumption. We have two advantages in this regard. First, our data are quite rich,
so it is possible to match treatments and controls on a wide range of observable pre-
treatment (that is, pre-displacement) characteristics. Second, a substantial literature on
the determinants of consumption growth provides guidance as to some of the factors
that are important to control for. For example, we know that consumption growth
varies significantly with age and family composition. Diﬀerences in these factors between
the treatment and control could certainly lead to biased estimates of the counterfactual
consumption growth of the treatment group, and so it is important to match on these
characteristics.
To reduce the dimension of the matching problem, we match on the estimated propen-
sity score. This was first suggested by Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) and is now quite
common in the evaluation literature (see, for example, Smith and Todd, 2003). In our
context, the propensity score is the conditional probability that a worker in our sample
13Sample sizes reported here diﬀer from those in our informal data analysis because of item non-
response - either to the one or more of the consumption questions or to one or more of the co-variates we
use to match treatments and controls. Because our data are rich and we control for a very large number
of observable characteristics in our matching estimators, some loss of sample is inevitable.
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is permanently (not temporarily) laid oﬀ.14 The propensity score was estimated using a
Probit model. The full set of explanatory variables in this model included a quadratic in
age, gender, education dummies and the logarithm of household size; dummies for mari-
tal status and spousal employment status; dummies indicating capital income and home
ownership; occupation dummies, a union dummy and job tenure dummies; a dummy for
unemployment insurance use in the previous two years; a polynomial in earnings in the
reference job; the local unemployment rate; broader region dummies and time dummies.
The estimation results are presented in Table 2. The model has significant ability to dis-
criminate between treatments and controls, with a 79% rate of correct classification. The
pseudo R-square is 25%. The distributions of estimated propensity scores in the treat-
ment and control groups are presented in Figure 3. We conducted a standard ‘balancing
test’ and found that the balancing property was satisfied.15
With the estimated propensity score in hand, common support was imposed. This
involved discarding 12 permanent layoﬀs with propensity scores greater than the largest
propensity score among the temporary layoﬀs. Matching was then done by locally linear
regression. The result of this exercise is reported in the second row of Table 3a. The
average consumption group for permanent layoﬀs satisfying the common support con-
dition is -3.0%. The average counterfactual consumption growth for this group (based
on the matched controls) is 3.4%. Therefore, we estimate that this group experienced a
consumption loss of 6.4%, relative to a benchmark of full insurance against job loss. This
14Propensity score matching estimators were implemented using PSMATCH2 in STATA. PSMATCH2
is generously made available by Leuven and Sianesi (2003).
15This test involves testing for mean diﬀerences in conditioning variables between the treatments and
controls within strata of the propensity scores. It was implemented with PSCORE in STATA. PSCORE
is generously made available by Becker and Ichino (2002).
Because this test involves many comparisons (26 conditioning variables by 8 strata of the estimated
propensity score) we followed the advice of Lee (2006) and made a Bonferroni approximation to maintain
the size of the test at 5%.
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is the Average Eﬀect of the Treatment on the Treated. A 95% confidence interval for this
estimate was constructed using the percentile method on 999 bootstrap replications. This
confidence interval, which accounts for the fact that the propensity score is estimated,
is -9.9% to -3.6%. Thus the average consumption loss is certainly statistically diﬀerent
from zero.
We also investigated the robustness of this estimate to diﬀerent aspects of the match-
ing procedure. In particular, we (i) halved and doubled the bandwidth for the locally lin-
ear regression; (ii) trimmed the 5% of treatments whose propensities scores corresponded
to the lowest estimated densities among controls; (iii) matched on the index rather than
predicted probability; and (iv) used a single nearest neighbor match rather than locally
linear regression. The resulting point estimates, which are reported in Appendix Table
A5, ranged from -5.5% to -6.7%, indicating that our baseline estimate is robust to these
choices.
Matching on a rich set of covariates involves some loss of sample because of item
nonreponse. One of the lessons drawn by Smith and Todd (2005) is that results can be
sensitive to changes in sample. To check this, we repeated the procedure with a more
parsimonious specification of the propensity score, and consequently a larger sample of
respondents. This produced a point estimate of -5.9%, which is reported in Appendix
Table A5. This further increases our confidence in the robustness of our baseline estimate.
As suggested in Section 2, it is of interest to know not just the average loss with
displacement, but how that loss varies with observable characteristics. Accordingly, we
repeated the above exercise for diﬀerent subsamples of the permanent layoﬀs. The results
are reported in Table 3b. Rows 1, 2 and 3 deal respectively with permanent layoﬀs (and
matching controls) who lost a union job, who were over 40 years of age, and who lost
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a job in which they had 10 or more years of tenure. (These groups are obviously not
mutually exclusive). The results indicate that older workers, and workers with high job
tenure experience particularly large consumption losses if permanently laid oﬀ. The point
estimates are -9.3% and -10.4% respectively. In Row 4 of Table 3b we focus on female
treatments and controls, where we find an estimated average eﬀect of job loss of -6.9%.
Finally, in Table 3c, we attempt to deal empirically with two possible shortcomings
of the theoretical framework developed in Section 2. The first issue we consider is that
our theoretical framework associates the cost of job loss with the revision to the mue
between the separation date (t) and a date just over a year later (t+1). If displacement
was known with certainty prior to our pre-separation consumption observation, then the
theory suggests that information should be fully incorporated into λt and hence ct. Our
empirical strategy would then fail to capture the cost of job loss.16
We cannot examine consumption changes prior to the separation date with our short
panel. However, respondents to the COEP surveys were asked (retrospective) questions
about formal notice of lay oﬀ and whether they “expected” the lay oﬀ. Respondents were
asked whether they received notice, and if so, how much notice they received. They were
also asked whether they expected the lay oﬀ, and for how long they held this expectation.
There is obviously some ambiguity regarding the interpretation of the latter. The pre-
separation consumption question refers to the “month before job ended.” To identify
workers who clearly had information about the layoﬀ prior to this period, we constructed
dummy variables for receiving advance notice 6 or more weeks prior to the layoﬀ, and
for expecting the layoﬀ 6 or more weeks prior to the layoﬀ.17 Unfortunately, in the 1993
16Existing evidence on this point is somewhat mixed. For example, Stephens (2001), using the P.S.I.D.
reports that household food consumption falls prior to a job loss, presumably as the probability of job
loss rises. However, Stephens (2004) reports that food consumption drops with job loss in the Health
and Retirement Survey do not appear to vary with households subjective job loss expectations.
17The choice of 6 weeks here reflects in part an ambiguity in the wording of the consumption question.
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survey the questions regarding length of notice and length of expectation were asked of a
random 20 percent of respondents. Thus using these questions results in a substantial loss
of sample size (albeit one where the data are missing at random.) Reports of significant
notice (or expectation) turn out to be uncommon in these data. Among the permanent
layoﬀs for which we have complete information, 12 percent had formal notice of the layoﬀ
6 or more weeks prior to the layoﬀ date, while 24 percent reported expecting the layoﬀ
6 or more weeks prior to the layoﬀ date. In the first two rows of Table 3c we report the
matching estimate of the eﬀect of job loss on consumption growth while deleting these
respondents. Deleting (from both treatment and control groups) those reporting formal
notice of the layoﬀ 6 or more weeks prior to the layoﬀ date essentially leaves our point
estimate unchanged, at -6.6%. Deleting those reporting expectation of the layoﬀ 6 or more
weeks prior to the layoﬀ date leads a point estimate of -10.4%. This is somewhat larger
than our baseline estimate and can be interpreted as the average eﬀect of an unexpected
displacement on those who experienced an unexpected displacement.
The second issue we consider is that our development in Section 2 (especially Equation
(8)) assumes separability of consumption and labor supply. Without this separability,
changes in consumption might reflect substitutions with leisure rather than changes in
the mue. As a rough check on this possibility, we implemented our estimator on the
subsample of layoﬀs that were in employment at the last interview (so that labor supply
was broadly similar at the pre- and post-displacement observations.) The results of this
exercise are reported in the last row of Table 3c. This sample restriction leads to a point
estimate of -4.6%. This is slightly smaller (in absolute value) than our baseline estimate,
It is not clear wether respondents would interpret “the month before the job ended” as the 30 days
terminating with the layoﬀ date or the last full calendar month prior to the layoﬀ date. In either
case, repondents with notice (or expectation) 6 or more weeks before the layoﬀ date certainly had this
information prior to period for which they report pre-separation consumption.
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but does not significantly change our assessment.
5 Policy Implications.
Workers who lose their job because of a plant closure or other permanent mass layoﬀ face
a potential loss of lifetime earnings and welfare. Such workers disproportionately bear the
costs of the adjustments necessary for the continued economic prosperity of their society.
There is clear scope for social gains from providing insurance against these losses. In the
absence of private insurance, some government provision is potentially useful. The actual
impact of government policies will depend on the seriousness of such long run losses and
their distribution across the working population. The main contribution of the current
paper is to provide a novel method of calculating the long run costs of a job loss that does
not require specification of the underlying labour market nor long panels on individual
workers.
Our analysis departs from the literature on the costs of job loss in two main ways.
First, we show that under specific assumptions, changes in consumption provide a good
measure of the long run cost of a job loss. The prior literature focusses on wages, the
duration of unemployment, and earnings after a displacement. It has proven very diﬃcult
to provide a credible link from these outcomes to long run welfare. In contrast, to the
extent that households are rational and forward looking, consumption changes reflect
both the household’s ability to adjust to the shock, through a variety of means, and
the household’s expectations of the long run eﬀects of the job loss. Thus consumption
changes provide a measure of the cost of job loss that is both comprehensive and long
run. In addition to the theoretical attraction of using consumption changes, there is an
empirical advantage in that we do not need a long time series of observation on each
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household; a short panel will do.
Our second departure from the current literature is our emphasis on defining the
appropriate counterfactual for policy analysis. The counterfactual we propose is the
ideal situation in which society provides full insurance against job loss shock. Job loss
costs relative to this benchmark provide an upper bound on the benefit of any new cost-
mitigating policy introduced in the current economic environment. Actually estimating
the cost of job loss requires a control group, and the choice of control group is strongly
influenced by the choice of counterfactual or benchmark. The past literature on displaced
worker has either foregone a control group, or (implicitly or explicitly) drawn controls
from the pool of non-displaced workers in the data at hand. We argue that, given our
choice of counterfactual, workers in continuing employment are poor controls since such
workers experience the positive shock of job retention. In our analysis, we employ an
alternative and novel source of controls: workers experiencing temporary layoﬀs with
a known date of recall. Firms that use temporary layoﬀs to manage demand shocks
eﬀectively insure their workers against job loss. Thus these workers provide a way to
approximate average consumption growth under the counter factual of full insurance.
We apply our methods to a Canadian survey of workers who experience a job separa-
tion in the mid-1990’s. We find that permanently displaced workers suﬀer a consumption
loss of between 4% and 10% of pre-job-loss consumption, with a point estimate of 6.4%.
One way to assess this number is to note that our estimate of consumption growth under
the counterfactual of full insurance is 3.4% over a period just longer than a year. Thus a
job loss is equivalent to losing two years of ‘normal’ consumption growth. This is a very
substantial loss. Moreover, the loss is higher for particular groups. For older workers the
estimated average loss is 9.3% and for workers who had been in their firm for over 10 years
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the estimated loss is 10.4%. The latter estimate is striking given that long tenure Cana-
dian workers who are permanently displaced are eligible for tenure related redundancy
payments which are designed to oﬀset the costs we are concerned with. The implication
is clearly that current rules regarding redundancy payments do not provide anything like
adequate insurance. This is not to recommend, of course, that we should increase cur-
rent levels of redundancy payments, since this may have other deleterious eﬀects, but
it does suggest that provisions in place in Canada in the mid-1990’s failed to provide
adequate insurance against a considerable individual risk. This leaves considerable scope
for government policies to mitigate the long run impacts of job loss.
6 Conclusions.
We provide a consumption based method for measuring the long run impact of displace-
ment from a job. Consumption losses are conceptually diﬀerent from earnings losses.
Earnings losses may be persistent, but both theory and data suggest that they are not
fully persistent: there is eventually some catch up since most workers find new employ-
ment, and there may be some recovery of wages as they accumulate new firm-specific
human capital or match quality. In contrast, the theoretical framework developed in
Section 2 suggests that consumption losses are roughly permanent. The intuition behind
this claim is that a forward looking household’s post-displacement consumption choice
already reflects their best guess of future earnings, including any anticipated catch up.
The principal virtue of our Euler equation based approach is that it does not require
specifying an underlying model of the labour market or the possibilities for self-insurance
through occupational choice, saving behaviour, work adjustments by a spouse or existing
governmental social insurance systems. They thus provide a relatively robust estimate
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of the costs of a job loss. They do not, however, provide a vehicle for the analysis of
specific policy suggestions for providing workers with better insurance against long run
losses. For that we do need structural estimates of the labour market and the insurance
possibilities open to individual workers. Such an analysis would provide a framework for
considering jointly consumption and labour supply and hence analyzing policy sugges-
tions that would be partly designed to oﬀer workers better insurance against the very
substantial losses we have found in this paper.
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TABLE 1a: Descriptive Statistics: Earnings and Expenditure Changes 
Pre- reference separation to last interview   
Proportional Changes in nominal monthly Amounts 
All Final Interview Respondents 
 
 
 
Layoffs 
 
Quit 
 
 
 
No 
Expectation 
of Recall 
 
Some 
Expectation 
of Recall 
 
Strong 
Expectation 
of Recall 
 
 
Earnings  q1
 
-1 
 
-1 
 
-1 
 
-0.40 
 
 q2
 
-0.47 
 
-0.19 
 
0 
 
0.09 
 
 q3
 
0.016 
 
0.025 
 
0.025 
 
0.04 
 
 mean
 
-0.44 
 
-0.39 
 
-0.31 
 
-0.013 
 
Difference of mean from no 
expectation group, [t-stat] 
 
 
 
0.044 
[1.9] 
 
0.13 
[5.1] 
 
0.42 
[11.1] 
 
Kruskal-Wallis rank test of 
common distribution with 
no expectation group: χ2(1)  
(p-value)  
 
 
 
8.6 
(0.003) 
 
36.5 
(<0.001) 
 
109.2 
(<0.001) 
 
Total Expenditure  q1
 
0 
 
0 
 
0 
 
0 
 
 q2
 
0 
 
0 
 
0 
 
0 
 
 q3
 
0.051 
 
0.044 
 
0.063 
 
0.11 
 
 mean
 
-0.033 
 
0.005 
 
0.023 
 
0.067 
 
Difference of mean from no 
expectation group, [t-stat ] 
 
 
 
0.038 
[4.2] 
 
0.056 
[5.7] 
 
0.099 
[6.7] 
 
Kruskal-Wallis rank test of 
common distribution with 
no expectation group: χ2(1) 
(p-value) 
 
 
 
11.6 
(<0.001) 
 
30.0 
(<0.001) 
 
39.0 
(<0.001) 
 
CPI % change mean
 
0.6 
 
1.4 
 
1.3 
 
1.5 
 
Weeks elapsed mean
 
59 
 
58 
 
58 
 
59 
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TABLE 1b: Descriptive Statistics: Earnings and Expenditure Changes 
Pre- reference separation to last interview   
Proportional changes in nominal monthly amounts 
Respondent Employed at Last Interview Only 
 
 
 
Layoffs 
 
Quit 
 
 
 
No 
Expectation 
of Recall 
Some 
Expectation 
of Recall 
 
Strong 
Expectation 
of Recall 
 
 
Earnings  q1 
 
-0.25 
 
-0.045 
 
0.0062 
 
0.025 
 
 q2 
 
0 
 
0.025 
 
0.025 
 
0.19 
 
 q3 
 
0.20 
 
0.097 
 
0.10 
 
0.45 
 
 mean 
 
0.032 
 
0.033 
 
0.071 
 
0.25 
 
difference of mean from no 
expectation group, [t-stat]  
 
 
 
0.00018 
[0.0] 
 
0.038 
[1.8] 
 
0.22 
[8.0] 
 
Kruskal-Wallis rank test of 
common distribution with 
no expectation group: χ2(1) 
(p-value) 
 
 
 
6.9 
(0.008) 
 
19.3 
(<0.001) 
 
63.4 
(<0.001) 
 
Total Expenditure  q1 
 
0 
 
0 
 
0 
 
0 
 
 q2 
 
0 
 
0 
 
0 
 
0.017 
 
 q3 
 
0.063 
 
0.056 
 
0.067 
 
0.14 
 
 mean 
 
0.003 
 
0.030 
 
0.042 
 
0.086 
 
difference of mean from no 
expectation group, [t-stat] 
 
 
 
0.027 
[2.7] 
 
0.039 
[3.8] 
 
0.083 
[6.1] 
 
Kruskal-Wallis rank test of 
common distribution with 
no expectation group: χ2(1) 
(p-value) 
 
 
 
2.9 
(0.09) 
 
12.1 
(<0.001) 
 
25.3 
(<0.001) 
 
CPI, % change mean 
 
0.6 
 
1.4 
 
1.3 
 
1.5 
 
Weeks elapsed mean 
 
59 
 
58 
 
59 
 
59 
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TABLE 2:  PROBIT ESTIMATION OF THE PROPENSITY SCORE 
Dependent variable = 1 if Permanent Layoff (No expectation of recall) 
                                   =0 if Temporary Layoff (Expects recall on a specific date) 
 Marginal 
Effect 
Standard Error of 
Marginal Effect 
High school graduate  0.011 [0.026] 
College graduate 0.022 [0.031] 
Age 0.003 [0.012] 
        Squared -0.006 [0.011] 
Ln(household size) -0.167 [0.036]** 
Male 0.068 [0.026]** 
Couple, spouse not employed 0.025 [0.026] 
Single  -0.185 [0.061]** 
Lone parent -0.033 [0.043] 
Some capital income, previous year 0.017 [0.022] 
Household owns home -0.016 [0.026] 
Manager, pre-separation job -0.124 [0.030]** 
Blue Collar, pre-separation job -0.190 [0.031]** 
Unionized, pre-separation job -0.136 [0.025]** 
3 -10 years tenure, pre-separation job -0.140 [0.025]** 
> 10 years tenure, pre-separation job -0.155 [0.034]** 
UI use in 1 of previous 2 years -0.145 [0.021]** 
Ln (real earnings, pre-separation job) 0.123 [0.032]** 
      Squared 0.026 [0.023] 
      Cubed -0.013 [0.015] 
Atlantic 0.037 [0.036] 
Quebec 0.031 [0.027] 
Prairies 0.135 [0.026]** 
British Columbia 0.024 [0.040] 
Local unemployment rate -0.134 [0.323] 
Separation in 1995 -0.358 [0.021]** 
Observations 2248  
Correctly Predicted 79%  
Pseudo R-square 0.25  
Notes: Standard errors in brackets, * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% 
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TABLE 3a: The Effect of Permanent Job Loss on Consumption Growth - Baseline Estimates 
Mean Consumption Growth (% )  Sample Sizes 
 
Treated 
Controls 
Permanent Layoffs 
 
(Treated) 
Temporary Layoffs  
With Recall Date 
(Controls) 
 
Difference 
[95% C.I.] 
 
Unmatched 
Comparison 
1461 
657 
-3.1 2.5 -5.6 
[-7.73, -3.55] 
Matched Controls, 
Common Support 
1449 
657 
-3.0 3.4 -6.4 
[-9.6, -3.8] 
 
Notes to the Matching Estimate (2nd Row): 
1. Treatments and controls were matched on the estimated propensity score, and common 
support was imposed. The propensity score was estimated with a Probit. Matching was 
done by locally linear regression. Additional details are in the text. 
2. The difference reported in the far right column is an estimate of the Average Effect of 
the Treatment on the Treated (where the treatment is job loss.) 
3. The confidence interval was constructed using the percentile method on 999 bootstrap 
replications.  
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TABLE 3b: The Effect of Permanent Job Loss on Consumption Growth - Subsamples 
                         (Matched Controls, Common Support) 
Mean Consumption Growth (% )  Sample Size 
 
Treated 
Controls 
Permanent Layoffs 
 
(Treated) 
Temporary Layoffs  
With Recall Date 
(Controls) 
 
Difference 
[95% C.I.] 
 
Unionized  386 
305 
-2.6 2.1 -4.7 
[-8.4, -0.8] 
Age > 40 years 579 
264 
-6.4 2.9 -9.3 
[-14.3, -4.5] 
Job Tenure  
> 10 years 
218 
172 
-7.4 3.0 -10.4 
[-17.6, -3.8] 
Women 701 
347 
-2.6 4.4 -6.9 
[-12.0, -2.0] 
 
Notes: 
1. Treatments and controls were matched on the estimated propensity score, and common 
support was imposed. The propensity score was estimated with a Probit. Matching was 
done by locally linear regression. Additional details are in the text. 
2. The difference reported in the far right column is an estimate of the Average Effect of 
the Treatment on the Treated (where the treatment is job loss.) 
3. Confidence intervals were constructed using the percentile method on 999 bootstrap 
replications.  
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TABLE 3c: The Effect of Permanent Job Loss on Consumption Growth – Subsamples II 
                         (Matched Controls, Common Support) 
Mean Consumption Growth (% )  Sample Size 
 
Treated 
Controls 
Permanent Layoffs 
 
(Treated) 
Temporary Layoffs  
With Recall Date 
(Controls) 
 
Difference 
[95% C.I.] 
 
Advanced Notice 
< 6 weeks (incl. 0) 
503 
392 
-1.6 5.0 -6.6 
[-13.3, -0.9] 
Expected Job Loss 
< 6 weeks (incl. 0) 
599 
293 
-2.4 8.0 -10.4 
[-14.7, -2.9] 
Employed at Last 
Interview 
780 
399 
-0.5 5.1 -4.6 
[-7.5, -1.8] 
 
Notes: 
1. Treatments and controls were matched on the estimated propensity score, and common 
support was imposed. The propensity score was estimated with a Probit. Matching was 
done by locally linear regression. Additional details are in the text. 
2. The difference reported in the far right column is an estimate of the Average Effect of 
the Treatment on the Treated (where the treatment is job loss.) 
3. Confidence intervals were constructed using the percentile method on 999 bootstrap 
replications.  
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Appendix: Further Data Description and Robustness Checks 
 
 
TABLE A1: Interview Timing, 1993 and 1995 COEP  
(Weeks since Reference Separation; Inter-quartile Range) 
 
 
 
1993 
Cohort 1 
 
1993 
Cohort 2 
 
1995  
Cohort 1 
 
1995 
Cohort 2 
 
Reference Job 
Separation 
 
Feb. - Mar. 
 
Apr. 
 
Jan.-Mar. 
 
Apr.-June 
 
Interview1 
 
27-29 
 
24-25 
 
36-40 
 
33-38 
 
Interview 2 
 
40-43 
 
37-40 
 
60-63 
 
54-57 
 
Interview 3 
 
61-64 
 
55-59 
 
X 
 
X 
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TABLE A2: Descriptive Statistics: Pre - Reference Separation Information 
 Layoffs Quits 
 No 
Expectation 
of Recall 
Some 
Expectation 
of Recall 
Strong 
Expectation of 
Recall 
 
1st Interview Obs.  3023 1417 1094 402 
COEP 1995 
(%) 
845 
(28%) 
1122 
(79%) 
794 
(73%) 
344 
(86%) 
Last Interview Obs. 
(%) 
2199 
(73%) 
1127 
(80%) 
890 
(81%) 
315 
(78%) 
     
Characteristics of Respondent and Household 
High school graduate 0.37 0.42 0.44 0.42 
College graduate 0.33 0.21 0.27 0.43 
Age 38.0 37.8 39.0 32.7 
Male 0.53 0.61 0.48 0.60 
Couple, spouse not 
employed* 
0.22 0.24 0.20 0.19 
Single*  0.17 0.19 0.13 0.22 
Lone parent* 0.089 0.050 0.072 0.041 
Ln (household size) 0.94 0.95 1.03 0.89 
Some capital income, 
previous year 
0.39 0.32 0.38 0.28 
Household owns home 0.62 0.66 0.71 0.60 
* Omitted household type is couple, spouse employed.
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TABLE A2: Descriptive Statistics: Pre - Reference Separation Information (Cont´d) 
 Layoffs Quits 
 No 
Expectation 
of Recall 
Some 
Expectation of 
Recall 
Strong 
Expectation of 
Recall 
 
Characteristics of Reference Separation Job 
manager 0.28 0.18 0.28 0.30 
blue collar 0.33 0.61 0.46 0.29 
union 0.27 0.42 0.47 0.15 
seasonal 0.10 0.28 0.33 0* 
expected loss 0.45 0.71 0.81 1* 
Job Tenure 
(Months) 
65.2 80.4 89.7 44.5 
Monthly Earnings  1.89 1.76 1.65 1.76 
 
Program Use 
 
UI in at least 1 of 
past 2 years 
0.55 0.80 0.74 0.40 
Labour Market 
Atlantic 0.08 0.13 0.11 0.09 
Quebec 0.27 0.40 0.31 0.22 
prairies 0.15 0.12 0.08 0.19 
BC 0.10 0.10 0.06 0.12 
Local 
unemployment 
Rate 
10.5% 10.6% 10.1% 
 
9.2% 
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TABLE A3: Descriptive Statistics: First Interview Information  
 
 
 
Layoffs 
 
Quit 
 
 
 
No 
Expectatio
n of Recall 
 
Some 
Expectation 
of Recall 
 
Strong 
Expectation 
of Recall 
 
 
All First Interview Respondents 
 
Employed 
 
0.44 
 
0.60 
 
0.80 
 
0.79 
 
Of Employed: 
Back at reference 
Employer 
 
0.13 
 
0.75 
 
0.90 
 
0.08 
 
Job as good as 
reference job* 
 
0.82 
 
0.89 
 
0.90 
 
0.96 
 
Of Non-Employed: 
Still in First UE Spell 
 
0.77 
 
0.53 
 
0.49 
 
0.26 
 
Searched in Last 4 
weeks 
 
0.82 
 
0.72 
 
0.59 
 
0.59 
 
Participation Rate 
 
0.84 
 
0.85 
 
0.89 
 
0.89 
 
Last Interview Respondents Only 
 
Employed 
 
0.43 
 
0.61 
 
0.80 
 
0.79 
 
Of Employed: 
Back at reference 
Employer 
 
0.12 
 
0.76 
 
0.90 
 
0.08 
 
Job as good as 
reference job* 
 
0.83 
 
0.89 
 
0.90 
 
0.96 
 
Of Non-Employed: 
Still in First Spell 
 
0.77 
 
0.52 
 
0.46 
 
0.28 
 
Searched in Last 4 
weeks 
 
0.81 
 
0.72 
 
0.61 
 
0.56 
 
Participation Rate 
 
0.84 
 
0.85 
 
0.89 
 
0.89 
* Including those back at reference employer
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TABLE A4: Descriptive Statistics: Last Interview Information  
 
 
 
Layoffs 
 
Quit 
 
 
 
No 
Expectation 
of Recall 
 
Some 
Expectation 
of Recall 
 
Strong 
Expectation 
of Recall 
 
 
Employed 
 
0.57 
 
0.59 
 
0.66 
 
0.80 
 
Of Employed: 
Back at reference 
employer 
 
0.26 
 
0.58 
 
0.71 
 
0.31 
 
Job as good as 
reference job*  
 
0.79 
 
0.84 
 
0.88 
 
0.94 
 
Of Non-Employed: 
Still in first UE spell 
 
0.44 
 
0.27 
 
0.20 
 
0.25 
 
Searched in Last 4 
weeks 
 
0.68 
 
0.60 
 
0.54 
 
0.33 
 
Participation Rate 
 
0.83 
 
0.71 
 
0.74 
 
0.82 
 
* Including those back at reference employer
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TABLE A5: The Effect of Permanent Job Loss on Consumption Growth – Robustness Checks 
Mean Consumption Growth (% )  Sample Size 
 
Treated 
Controls 
Permanent 
Layoffs  
 
(Treated) 
Temporary 
Layoffs  
With Recall Date 
(Controls) 
 
Difference 
 
 
Halved the bandwidth 
in local linear 
regression used in 
matching  
1449 
657 
-3.0 3.7 -6.6 
 
Doubled the bandwidth 1449 
657 
-3.0 3.1 -6.1 
 
Deleted the 5% of 
treatments whose 
propensity scores 
corresponded to the 
lowest estimated 
densities among 
controls 
1388 
657 
-2.9 2.8 -5.7 
 
Matched in the index 
rather than the 
predicted probability 
1449 
657 
-3.0 3.3 -6.3 
 
Used a single nearest 
neighbour match 
rather than locally 
linear regression 
1449 
657 
-3.0 2.5 -5.5 
 
More parsimonious 
specification of the 
propensity score model 
1688 
723 
-3.5 2.4 -5.9 
 
Notes: 
1. The difference reported in the far right column is an estimate of the Average Effect of 
the Treatment on the Treated (where the treatment is job loss.) 
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